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Abstract: 
Using an over-lapping generations (OLG) model, we show how small open economies 
can enhance their growth through educational subsidies financed via government debt. 
In our model, we endogenize human capital and fertility without the strong assumptions 
of altruism or positive spill over effects from human capital accumulation. We show 
that subsidizing education through government debt leads to a Pareto improvement of 
all generations. Even if a country is a net borrower in the international capital market, 
we show that this subsidy-policy can help, under certain conditions, to improve its net 
borrowing position. Especially, our analysis can be applied to less developed countries, 
which are locked in a low development trap. A further desirable outcome of our analysis 
is that fertility rates decline for the small and less developed countries.  
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1 Introduction  
After the Korean War in 1953, South Korea was one of the poorest countries in 
the world. However, over the succeeding five decades, the country has made immense 
progress and now stands as an impressing example of a fast growing economy. South 
Korea in retrospect has experienced an increase in per capita income from US$1,571 
(constant) in 1960 to US$15,881 (USD) in 2000. Over these periods, the average years 
of schooling also increased from 4.3 years to 11.1 years on the back of a decline of total 
fertility rate from 5.2 children per female to 1.2 children per female (Hanushek and 
Woessmann, 2010; and World Bank, 2013) and a comfortable ratio of education 
expenditure of 7.6% of the GDP (OECD, 2011) necessary for triggering growth in 
human capital accumulation. On the other hand, Mexico which was twice as rich as 
Korea in 1960 with a per capita income of US$3,970 (constant) experienced an increase 
of per capita income to US$8766 (constant) in 2000. The years of schooling over these 
periods increased from 2.8 years in 1960 to 7.6 years in 2000 while the fertility rate 
declined from 6.8 children per female (in 1960) to 2.5 children (in 2000) and the 
relative expenditure on education was 5.8% of GDP (OECD, 2011), which was 
significantly lower than South Korea.1 Against these backdrops, we argue that high 
education expenditure and low fertility rates have influenced the per capita growth rates 
of these two economies. More specifically, we assert that high education and low 
fertility rate has supported the momentous growth of South Korea and that the converse 
held for Mexico.2   
 
In regards to developing counties, most if not all of them are characterized by 
low productivity, high population growth, and low human capital that constraint their 
growth potential.  In this paper, we highlight the importance of education and human 
capital accumulation for such an economy. Inevitably, education expenditure is a 
significant portion of budget for both households and the economy, particularly for 
countries where population growth is high. The cost is both in terms of raising children 
and providing quality education at all levels. Subsequently, there is a trade-off between 
                                                 
1
 It should be noted that the private willingness to pay for education is relatively high in Korea.  
2
 Although the argument is a necessary condition, it may not be sufficient in aggregate. We accept that 
other intuitional and structural factors have influenced the growth path of these two countries. 
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quantity and quality of human capital in an economy. Our premise is based on the 
notion that that human capital accumulation is the engine of growth.3  
 
Nevertheless, our argument is different from Lucas (1988), who assumed 
increasing returns to scale caused by positive externalities and also from Barro (1974) 
and Zhang (2003, 2006) who impressed the importance of intergenerational altruism. In 
our analysis, we argue that even when we relax the assumptions of strong altruism and 
the existence of externalities, human capital accumulation can be shown to play a vital 
role in enhancing economic growth. More specifically, we show that a government 
subsidy for education is welfare and growth enhancing in a small open economy under 
certain conditions. The rest of the paper is outlined as follows. In section 2, we provide 
a brief literature review.4 In section 3, the method, model and arguments are presented. 
Section 4 concludes with some policy implications.  
 
2 Literature Review 
The literature on endogenizing fertility and human capital in growth model goes 
back to Becker et al. (1990) and Becker and Barro (1988). Using an intertemporal utility 
function, they assume that that a higher fertility rate of the present generation raises the 
discount factor on per capita future consumption. Consequently, a higher fertility rate 
discourages investments in human and physical capital. On the other hand, higher 
stocks of physical and human capital (education) reduce the number of children because 
of the high cost of raising and caring for children. 
 
One strand of the literature is based on the work of Kolmar (1997), which 
includes only endogenous fertility behaviour in a standard OLG framework. His idea 
was further extended by Fenge and Meier (2005, 2009) and Groezen et al. (2003). 
However, these scholars did not concentrate on government debts but on pay-as-you-go 
pension systems, which are in economic sense, a form of government debt.5 They show 
that for a small country under certain conditions, it is possible to increase the fertility 
rate and the welfare simultaneously. They assumed that pension is dependent on the 
                                                 
3
 In retrospect, the Asian success story since the last 50 years was in large part due the substantial drive to 
promote education and human development.        
4
 We do not insist that our literature review is exhaustive  or unmitigated, because of space restrictions. 
5
 A pay-as-you-go pension system is a form of a government debt caused by government bond issuance 
because both are characterized by a government’s promise to pay a pension respectively, that is, to pay 
back the debt plus interest.  
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number of children and that the growth in population attracts higher capital inflows so 
that all individuals are better off. These results hold only for small open economies. On 
the contrary, Stauvermann et al. (2013) argues that, except for increase in fertility rates, 
these results do not hold in an OLG-model with endogenous growth because reduced 
savings tend to reduce the per-capita growth rates and hence the welfare of future 
generation. Furthermore, the authors show that increase in fertility is accompanied by 
high costs for the future generations, which further decrease the rate of capital 
accumulation, per capita growth and capital, and hence the labour income. 
 
Another strand of literature goes back to Bental (1989), Raut (1992), Cigno 
(1993), and Zhang and Nishimura (1993), Zhang and Zhang (1995) and Zhang (1995). 
These authors interpret children as an insurance good for old age. In their models, the 
introduction of a pay-as-you-go pension scheme decreases the importance of children 
and therefore the number of them declines. As a consequence, the per capita income 
growth rises and the fertility reducing effect of a pension system offsets the saving 
reducing effect, which is usually the outcome of the introduction of a pay-as-you-go 
pension system.  
 
Moreover, Zhang (1997, 2003, 2006) and Li and Zhang (2008) provides another 
dimension on fertility and human capital accumulation. Their main assumptions are that 
individuals are altruistic with respect to their offspring and that the human capital 
accumulation is associated with positive externalities (similar to Lucas, 1988). 
Subsequently, (and not surprisingly), a government debt is able to internalize the 
externality, which leads to a welfare gain. 
 
In contrast to these approaches, our approach relaxes the assumption of altruism 
and externalities derived from human capital accumulation. We argue that the 
generation who gain from human capital investment should pay partly for it, instead of 
the entire burden of responsibility being put on the current generation. Moreover, we 
assume that parents (the current generation) can derive part of their utility from the 
number of children and their investment in human capital (education) of their children. 
Therefore, under these conditions, we show that it is possible to increase growth of the 
economy by decreasing the number of children. Our results are in contrast to Fanti and 
Gori (2008a, 2008b). In summary, their study show that a general subsidy for children 
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raises the fertility rate in the long run and lowers it in the short run provided the 
preference for the quality of children exceeds the preference for the number of children. 
In our model, this is not the case. We argue that by subsidizing education of children 
and not the number of them will have a welfare enhancing effect and a negative effect 
on fertility, independently of the preferences for the quality or quantity for children. 
 
3 The model   
To model the production side in a small open economy, we convene with 
production function of Lucas (1988) and Uzawa (1965). The production depends on 
physical and human capital and has the following form:  
 
  , 	  , 
	        (1) 
 
Here  is the production,  is the capital stock, and   
, is the human capital 
stock which results from the product of the average human capital per head () times 
the number of workers (
). The production function exhibits the usual diminishing 
marginal productivities in each input factor, fulfils the Inada conditions and is linear 
homogenous. 6  The subscript t indicates period.  Furthermore, we assume that the 
creation of human capital depends on the age of an individual (degree of ‘youngness’), 
the investments in education of the current generation, and the average human capital of 
the current generation. Our human capital function is similar to Lucas (1988) and de la 
Croix and Roepke (2003). The efforts are represented by , which is measured in time. 
The total available time is normalized to one. Then the human capital of a worker in 
period t is given by:  
 
    Λ    	.       (2) 
 
The parameter   0  measures the effectiveness of learning and the parameter 1 
  0  represents the depreciation rate of human capital. We assume a positive 
depreciation rate, because it is not unknown in human history that human knowledge 
vanishes rarely because of different reasons. Here the parameter Λ satisfies Λ  . This 
assumption guarantees that the human capital stock will not totally degrade, if the effort 
 is zero. As in de la Croix and Roepke (2003) we assume 0,1  and ! 0,1   . 
The variable   represents the average human capital stock per capita, which creates 
spillovers. To simplify the analysis, we assume that   !  1 and Λ  1. Then we get 
for the resulting growth factor of human capital: 
 
                                                 
6
 In capital per capita human capital unit, the production function is transformed to "#$%&   '()*) , 1+. 
Hence the the Inada conditions:  "0	  0;  "∞	  ∞; ".∞	  0; and "/0	  ∞ holds.   
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1  01  1    	 ' 1
2)34
1)34
+

       (3) 
 
Assuming that all individuals are identical, the resulting growth rate of human capital 
per capita results in 01     . Therefore the human capital per capita can 
decrease, remain constant or increase.    
 
Because of the assumption of a small open economy, the wage rate per human capital 
unit  56, and the interest factor 7 is determined on the world capital market. The capital 
stock used in this economy adjusts according to the factor prices. Assuming that the 
physical capital is totally depreciated within one period, we get the following equations: 
 
56  "#$%&  " ′#$%&$%        (4) 
7  " ′#$%&           (5) 
 
The function "#$%&   '()*) , 1+ represents the production function per human capital 
unit. Then the resulting wage rate per capita is given by 5  56.  
 
  We use a three period overlapping generation (OLG) model similar to Allais 
(1947), Samuelson (1958) and Diamond (1965). According to their model, in the first 
period of life, an individual is relatively young, not yet prepared to work, and/or 
participate in economic decision making, and hence undergoes education funded by her 
parents. In the second period of life, the individual supplies labour which is considered 
to be offered inelastically; gives birth to 8 children, rears and educates her offspring 
and consumes 9  and saves  :  amounts respectively. In the third period of life the 
individual is unable to work and lives from her savings and interest income, that 
is,  9;<  7: . Subsequently, the utility function of the individual over the three 
periods is defined as the following log-linear equation. This form of the utility function 
is a variation of those used by Fanti and Gori (2008a, 2008b), and de la Croix and 
Roepke (2003). Subsequently:   
 
=9, 9;< , 8, 8	=ln9  @ln9;<  Aln8  Bln8	.   (6) 
 
The parameter q reflects the subjective discount factor. The last two terms in equation 
(6) expresses the relationship between the quality and quantity of children (Becker, 
1960; 1991; Becker and Lewis, 1973; Becker and Tomes, 1976). Both summands can 
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be rewritten as CD'8E;FE+.7 We assume that both preference parameters A and B lie 
in the range of zero and one. The last summand, Bln8	, reflects the desire of the 
parent to educate her child which depends on her efforts per child  times the number 
of children 8. Alternatively, the term 8 can be also interpreted as expenditures for 
education, which have to be paid in the form of tuition fees and the parents have to 
work  time units to finance the fees of one child. This amount is multiplied by the 
number of children to derive the expenditure on education. This last part represents a 
form of altruism towards raising the offspring. However, this form of altruism is 
different from the approach used by Barro (1974) which was based on the future utility 
of the children. In our case, a parent is only interested to guarantee her children a 
specific amount of education and therefore is constrained by the following budget 
defined as: 
 
9 G 51  1  H	8  I8	  :  J      (7) 
9;< G 7;:          (8) 
 
Combining (7) and (8) gives us a single budget constraint: 
 
51  1  H	8  I8	  J  9  K)L4
M
N)L4
 0     (9) 
 
We assume that the government can decrease the costs of education by giving a subsidy 
H for education, where the government finances this subsidy by issuing government 
bonds  O with a term of one period. The parameter b represents the constant 
consumption expenditures per child. Additionally the government collects a tax of J 
per capita to finance its debt and interest payments. This means that the government 
debt per worker at the beginning of the current period P equals the subsidies per child 
of the previous period times the interest factor, Rt. This means implicitly, that a worker 
pays back the subsidies to market conditions she received as she was young. That is: 
 
P  7O  7H58.       (10)  
 
                                                 
7
 The quality-quantity trade-off means that given a budget, parents can either invest in the number of 
children or in the quality of children (education). Of course, parents would like to do both, to increase the 
number of children and the quality, however, there will always be a trade-off. Liu, Zhang, and Yi (2008), 
Rosenzweig and Wolpin (1980) and Rosenzweig and Zhang (2009) confirm the existence of the quality-
quantity tradeoff of children econometrically. 
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It should be noted that parents are unable to get an analogous loan contract on the 
capital market, because of the moral hazard problem. To guarantee a balanced 
government budget, the lump sum tax of an individual working in period t has to be:  
 
J  7O  7H5  7HQ56.    (11) 
 
The government is financing the educational subsidies by a government debt, which 
will be covered by the tax revenue in the future. We maximize (6) subject to (9) by 
constructing the following Lagrange function:  
 

9, 9;< , R	=ln9  @ln9;<  Aln8  Bln8	  
R '51  Q1  H	8  I8	  J  9  K)L4
M
N)L4
+.    (12)  
 
Accordingly, the first order conditions are: 
 

K)4
 R  0,           (13) 
S
K)L4M
 TN)L4  0,         (14) 
F;E
U)
 R51  H	  I  0,       (15) 
E
V)
 R51  H	8  0,        (16) 
51  1  H	8  I8	  J  9  K)L4
M
N)L4
 0.     (17) 
 
Substituting (15) into (16) and solving for the investment in education gives us:  
 
W  EXY	F .          (18) 
 
By assuming tax rate to be zero, equation (18) gives us the relationship between the 
preference to spend time (money) for educating children and the preference to spend 
time (money) for the number of children B A⁄  times the inverse relationship between the 
associated marginal costs of these activities I 1⁄ . Because of the subsidy H the marginal 
costs of educating a child decreases and hence the investments in the education of 
children increases. However, to guarantee an interior solution, we assume that 1 
H	A  BI. In the corner solution the parent would have only one child.8 Subsequently, 
the growth rate of human capital is given by: 
 
                                                 
8
 For convenience, we restrict the analysis to interior solutions.   
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01W  [EXY	F  .         (19) 
 
In summary, the growth rate of human capital stock depends positively on the pure child 
raising costs b, the preference parameter for the quality of children B, the subsidy rate 
for education H, and negatively on the depreciation rate m and the preference parameter 
for the number of children A. It should be noted that the depreciation rate can also be a 
variable determined by culture or politics.9  Because of the fact that the per capita 
growth is driven by the human capital accumulation, different types of equilibria are 
possible:  
 
Equilibria: The economy grows if  [EXY	F  . If equality holds, steady-state or no-
growth equilibrium is realized and if the relation is reverted the economy shrinks. 
However, the growth rate of human capital can be positive, constant or negative, even if 
education is taking place. Solving for the remaining variables, we get the following 
quantities:  
 
9W  1)34
#;\]W& 6^)_)
;S;F;E ,        (20) 
9;<W  7;@ '
1)34#;\]W& 6^)_)
;S;F;E +,       (21) 
8W  F
#1)34#;\]W& 6^)_)&
1)34#;\]W& 6^);S;F;E	
.        (22) 
 
Because of our small country assumption, the capital intensity per human capital unit is 
determined on the international capital market. We define the equilibrium wage rate per 
unit of human capital as 56  and the worldwide interest rate as R. If we now substitute (11) 
into (20) to (22) and using (18) and (19), we get the following equilibrium quantities:  
 
9W 
6^ 1)#FY	`	;EX[NY	&
F;S;F;E	Y	  ,          (23) 
9;<W 
SN 6^ 1)#FY	`	;EX[NY	&
F;S;F;E	Y	  ,      (24) 
8W  F
#FY	`	;EX[NY	&
X;S;F;E	FY	`	;[EX	 ,       (25) 
 
and the net savings per capita, which is the private savings less the government bonds 
per capita to finance the subsidy gives us:  
 
                                                 
9
 For example Pol Pot and his Khmer Rouge government has increased the depreciation rate in Cambodia 
dramatically by killing mostly all Cambodian intellectuals, even that the Khmer Rouge were only 3 years 
in power, or the Taliban government also increased the depreciation rate of the human capital by 
prohibiting female work and schooling of girls. Or alternatively, HIV is reducing the human capital in 
African countries. 
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:UW  :56, H, 7	  O  6^ 1)
Y	`	F;EX[NY	 S[EX;FSY	`	EY	 
;S;F;E	FY	Y	`	F;[EX a0 (26)  
 
It should be noted, that the net savings per capita is negative, if the individual savings 
per capita is lower than the value of the issued bonds per capita. In such a case, part of 
the bonds is purchased by foreigners. However, if the country is a net borrower on the 
international capital market depends on the current aggregate net savings and the 
equilibrium capital stock of the following period. Now we can analyze the effect of an 
increasing subsidy rate H on the equilibrium values of this economy.  By differentiating 
(17) with respect to H, yields the effect on the human capital accumulation: 
 
b\)]W
bY 
EX
Y	MF  0    (27) 
 
Not surprisingly, the subsidy will increase the investments in human capital. This means 
the subsidy can turn a shrinking or stagnant economy into a growing one. Subsequently, 
subsidy can be considered as a policy measure for an economy to come out of a low 
equilibrium trap. The effect of the fertility equals to:  
 
bU)W
bY  
FNEF`	;[EX	
X;S;F;E	FcY	;EX	M d 0.    (28)  
 
Obviously, the fertility rate will decrease, if the subsidy increases to reduce the cost of 
education. This effect is caused by the fact that the pure child raising costs increases 
relative to the costs of education.  
 
Proposition 1: Undoubtedly, a human capital subsidy financed via a government debt, 
will decrease the fertility rate.    
 
Next, we derive the effect of an increasing subsidy and the coinciding tax on the current 
and future consumption:  
 
bK)4W
bY 
6^ 1)34EX[N	
F;S;F;E	Y	M  0, if   7       (29) 
 
bK)L4MW
bY 
SN 6^ 1)34EX[N	
F;S;F;E	Y	M  0, if   7      (30) 
 
Both, the current and future consumption increases, if the productivity parameter of 
human capital building  exceeds the interest factor R. Intuitively, the result is obvious, 
because if the rate of return of a time unit invested in human capital exceeds the 
international capital market interest rate of an implicitly invested time unit, the 
consumption possibilities increase. If the opposite holds, the consumption declines in 
both periods. Subsequently, we derive the effect on the net savings, where H  0: 
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fbg)h
bY iYjk 
6^ 1)EXS[N	F 
F;S;F;E	 a 0.       (31) 
 
The effect of the subsidy with respect to net savings is ambiguous; it strongly depends 
on the difference of the marginal productivity of human capital building   and the 
interest factor. If 7  , the net savings declines unambiguously. However, if I@ 
I@7  A holds, the net savings rises if a subsidy is introduced. This implies that in order 
to guarantee that the net savings increases, the difference between the marginal 
productivity of time with respect to human capital building and the marginal 
productivity of physical capital must be sufficiently large. This difference will be larger 
the stronger the preference for the number of children A, the lower the costs to raise a 
child b, and the lower the discount factor q.  
 
For a country to be a net lender or net borrower in the international capital market will 
depend on how huge the national savings per human capital unit are with respect to the 
worldwide equilibrium capital stock per human capital unit. Let us assume that the 
domestic country is a net borrower in the world capital market. Then we know from (27) 
that the increase of the subsidy can improve or worsen the net borrowing position.  
 
Proposition 2: If  I@  7	  A , ( I@  7	 d A ) the introduction of a debt-
financed subsidy for education will enhance (retard) the savings per capita and improve 
(worsen) the net borrowing position of the country.  
 
Next, we analyze the welfare effects of an increase in the subsidy rate. If the subsidy is 
increased in t-1 period, the older generation will be indifferent and the younger 
generation will be better off because the latter will receive subsidy without any 
obligation. The relevant generation is therefore the young generation in period t, 
because they have to pay the government debt. The utility function of generation t is 
therefore given by:  
 
=9W, 9;<W , 8W, W8W, H	=ln9W  @ln9;<W  Aln8W  BlnW8W	.    (32) 
 
If we introduce a subsidy for human capital building, the effect on the utility of this 
generation can be ascertained by differentiating (32) with respect to H at the point where 
H  0. Calculating this, we get:  
 
fbl
bYiYjk 
Em;S;E	[N;S;E;F	 X;`	Fn
E;F	c .
10
      (33) 
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 Even that it is beyond of the scope of the paper we should note the following.  If the derivative is 
positive at H  0, then there exists either an optimal subsidy rate between zero and one, or the utility 
function is continuously increasing in the subsidy rate until the educational time strives to its maximum.   
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Proposition 3: An introduction of a human capital subsidy will always increase the 
utility of the representative individual of generation t, if 1  @  B	  71  @ 
B  A	. 
  
The condition of proposition 3, in general, is fulfilled if the interest rate is not 
implausibly high. The intuition behind this result is that the subsidy reduces the 
marginal costs of education relative to child rearing costs. This effect increases the 
investments in education and lowers the number of children. If the market interest rate 
is not too high in relation to the rate of return of human capital, a higher tax burden of 
the working generation is overcompensated by an increase in wage caused by a higher 
human capital. It should be noted that a welfare increase under certain conditions is also 
possible if the interest rate exceeds the productivity of human capital accumulation. 
Therefore, it can conclude that a Pareto improvement will always be realized if the 
condition of proposition 3 holds.  
 
Further, if the interest factor is in the usual range,11 then generation t is better-off after 
the introduction of a subsidy. The following generation will also realize a welfare gain 
because their income will be higher given a higher growth rate of human capital 
accumulation and wages income as a result of education support via government 
subsidy. Therefore, an introduction of a subsidy for education will lead to a welfare 
increase of all generations as long as the parameter values B, A, I and  are sufficiently 
accommodative.  
 
4 Conclusion and policy discussion 
In this paper, we showed that building human capital through government debt will 
provide a beneficial outcome both on the current and future generations, even in the 
absence of positive externality and altruism in the sense of Barro (1974). Specifically, 
we have shown that the proposed finance mechanism reduces the fertility rate and 
enhance the human capital accumulation, and hence the per capita growth rate of 
income. Additionally, under certain conditions, it was shown that the net borrowing 
                                                 
11
 The usual range for the real interest rate is 3-6 percent over a 10-15 years period. According to the 
OECD (2011) the (private) rate of return of human capital in OECD countries lies between 9.1-18.5% in 
2007 for tertiary education and between 7.5-21.4% for secondary education.  
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position of the economy improves and the welfare in the sense of Pareto outcome 
increases.  
 
If we take into account the recent publication of Barro and Lee (2010) on human capital, 
then it is obvious that there are still huge differences with respect to human capital 
building in developed and developing countries. For example, in 2010, the years of 
schooling of people older than 15 years in developed countries were 11.0 years and in 
developing countries, it was 7.1 years. Moreover, in regards to the completion of 
tertiary education, the percentages of population figures stood at 14.5 for developed 
countries and only 5.1 percent for developing countries. On the other hand, 17.4 percent 
of the population did not attend school in 2010 in developing countries. This number 
stood at 2.3 percent for developed countries. Considering the estimated rate of return of 
one more year of schooling from Barro and Lee (2010), it is obvious that a minimum of 
6 percent is by far the real interest rate in the international capital market.  
 
Even though subsidizing education via government debt may not have any short-run 
welfare-enhancing effect, it is likely to have a momentous long-term effect on the 
premise that with human capital accumulation via education for all, over time, the 
growth rate of the economy also increases. In a world where altruistic motivations 
dominates parents preferences for their children’s education as future investment, the 
argument of subsidizing education becomes even more strong and the net savings tend 
to increase under certain conditions (as indicated above). Nevertheless, we have shown 
that when education is financed via subsidy, the outcome is unambiguously welfare 
enhancing. Therefore, from development aid perspective, it would make sense to give 
concessional loans to small and developing countries to finance education and human 
capital development in areas of resource deficit identified both in the developing and the 
developed economies. 
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